On Emotion and Value in David Hume and Max Scheler Essay -- David Hume

On Emotion and Value in David Hume and Max SchelerABSTRACT While some philosophers tend to exclude either significance of emotion for the moral life, others place them in the center of both the moral life and the theory of value judgment. This paper presents a confrontation of devil classic positions of the second type, namely the position of Hume and Scheler. The ultimate goal of this confrontation is metatheoretical particularly as it concerns the analysis of the relations between the appraisal of emotion and the idea of value in this kind of theory of value judgment. In conclusion, I point to some important theoretical assumptions which underlie the positions of both thinkers despite any the other differences between them. In at least four types of ethical theories emotions and feelings are regarded as a vital factor in explaining the nature of both value judgement and value itself. Such types of ethical theories, however, offer not only different theories of value and valuat ion but they also assume or imply quite different theories of emotions and feelings. A look at the history of philosophical psychology can convince us that there has been no by and large accepted theory of emotion but the idea of emotion has been changing together with the idea of mind or soul. (1) One could expect that there is a correlation between the idea of emotion and the idea of value or the good in each type of the above mentioned theories. In what follows, I shall address this correlation for two ethical theories in greater detail. I shall consider the moral philosophy of David Hume which I construe as psychological naturalism of non-relativistic type. (2) I shall also consider the case of emotional intuitionism exemplified by Max Scheler. Both H... ...the objects of emotion see Sousa, de R. - The Rationality of Emotion, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1990.(9) For excellent discussion of this point see Hudson, S. D. - Humean fun Reconsidered, Canadian Journal of Philosoph y 5 (1975), no 4, pp. 545-62 Fieser, J. - Humes Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors, Hume Studies 18 (1992), no 1, pp. 1-17.(10) See note 8 above.(11) Scheler, Max - Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 2, Francke Verlag, capital of Switzerland - Mnchen 1954, pp. 256-278 hereafter cited as F.(12) F, pp. 341-356. See also Smith, Q. - Schelers Stratification of Emotional Life and Strawsons Person, Philosophical Studies (Irleand), 25 (1977), pp. 103-127. (13) F, pp. 125 -130.(14) Cf. Calhoun, Ch., Solomon, R. C. - What is an Emotion, Oxford University Press, New York 1984.